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Abstract 
This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government 
preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of EU 
member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 
2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. 
Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors 
were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In 
contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our 
understanding of preference formation in the EU and the viability of future EMU reform. 
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Introduction 
Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in late 2009, European policy-makers have agreed to 
a string of reforms that together amount to a profound deepening of fiscal and monetary 
cooperation in the Eurozone. Fighting a rearguard battle against the crisis, European Union 
(EU) governments have created joint resources for Eurozone states in crisis (European 
Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism), strengthened the Stability and 
Growth Pact through multiple sets of reforms (Six-Pack and Two-Pack), agreed on a new treaty 
to force a balancing of government budgets (Fiscal Compact), and adopted measures to 
establish a banking union (Single Supervisory Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism). 
These reforms have not come lightly. On the contrary, they have typically resulted from an 
intense battle against the raging crisis and arduous negotiations among the governments. It is 
also far from clear that they will be sufficient to deal with fundamental tensions in the 
construction of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Still, these reforms illustrate how 
European integration often feeds on crises to take significant new strides. 
 This article examines national preference formation concerning these reforms. What were 
the factors that shaped governments’ preferences about EMU reforms? Did concerns about 
countries’ structural economic vulnerability matter, or rather fluctuations in public support for 
the Eurozone? The appreciation of how economic and political factors combine in explaining 
the Eurozone crisis and ensuing reforms is still limited in existing scholarship (Copelovitch et 
al., 2016: 812-13). A more solid comprehension of preference formation on Eurozone reform, 
however, is central to deepening our understanding of the logics and mechanisms of European 
economic governance. Moreover, unveiling the factors that led governments to adopt certain 
positions on Eurozone reform informs us about the limits and possibilities for establishing a 
viable supranational monetary union in the EU and beyond. 
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 Existing research debates whether government preferences on EMU reform are primarily 
determined by structural economic factors or by political considerations (Armingeon and 
Skyler, 2017, Schlipphak and Treib, 2017, Tarlea 2018, 2019). We take our starting point in 
the economic perspective and develop an argument emphasizing financial sector exposure as a 
determinant of government preferences. Countries’ financial sectors are varyingly vulnerable 
because of their cross-sectoral and cross-national interconnectedness. The more exposed a 
financial sector, the greater the expected vulnerabilities of a country to external shocks. As a 
result, governments with highly exposed financial sectors should be more likely to prefer 
European rather than national solutions to the crisis. This is in line with expectations formulated 
by integrationists for whom interdependence is generally a driving force of regional integration 
(cf. Leuffen et al., 2012). 
 We contrast our argument with an alternative explanation of governmental preference 
formation on EMU reform focusing more strongly on the impact of political factors such as 
public opinion, institutions and the surge of Eurosceptic parties. These factors tie in with the 
domestic politics literature on international relations, which highlights the importance of vote 
maximization for explaining preference formation more generally (Bernhard and Leblang, 
2016; Kim, 2016; Walter, 2016).  
 We rely on the EMU Positions dataset (Wasserfallen et al., 2018) in order to empirically 
analyze the economic and political factors that informed national preference formation during 
the Eurozone crisis. The dataset contains information about the preferences of the 28 member 
states on a broad range of policies, including issues on financial transfers, fiscal discipline, 
financial regulation and institutional reform under discussion between 2010 and 2015. The 
issues are scaled in a way that ranges from 0 (representing the least ambitious reform proposals) 
to 100 (representing the most ambitious reform propositions). When conceiving of 100 as the 
more ‘European’ solution (be that with respect to redistributive measures or supranational 
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restrictions on national economic and fiscal policies), the scale captures what integrationists 
would call more ‘European integration’. 
 A series of multilevel regression models of government preferences on 40 selected reform 
issues suggest that preferences for more European economic integration are largely a function 
of a country’s financial vulnerability, controlling for a number of economic and public opinion 
indicators. We account for the clustered structure of the data of government preferences into 
policy packages. More specifically, the evidence suggests that countries’ financial sector 
exposure is the strongest predictor for national preferences on EMU reform; in contrast, 
measures relating to domestic politics have no systematic impact. These findings are robust 
across a range of alternative model specifications, including one that tests for the potential 
influence of ideas. 
 The article shows that reaching preference compatibility necessary for enacting political 
change is far from trivial given that member state preferences for EMU reforms are primarily 
driven by financial vulnerabilities that differ for each member state. At the same time, our 
analysis highlights that more economic interdependence in the Eurozone contributes to a 
stronger alignment of preferences and that party politics play a smaller role than expected. 
Finally, we demonstrate that predicting preferences for EMU reform is quite straightforward, 
which may facilitate elaborating realistic scenarios and solutions in future crisis situations. 
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Theory 
Our theoretical argument is centered on member state preference formation concerning policy 
change and integration in the area of EMU. The existing literature offers contrasting economic 
and political accounts of EMU reform during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
We side with the economic perspective and develop a hypothesis focused on how financial 
market exposure shapes governmental preferences. We expect a higher market exposure to be 
correlated with a higher degree of support for European integration. We then provide an 
overview of several alternative explanations that place political factors center-stage. 
 
Economic determinants of governmental preferences 
Our argument rests on the assumption that governments act as risk minimizers, particularly 
during a crisis, and that they were mainly driven by national economic considerations when 
deciding on EMU reforms. As the political economy literature extensively documents, during 
the Eurozone crisis different countries witnessed different degrees of economic vulnerability 
due to an uneven exposure of their banks to debtor countries (e.g. Frieden and Walter, 2017; 
Hall, 2012). In contrast to economic theories of the optimum currency area that emphasize 
systemic challenges in the EMU (Mundell, 1961; Obstfeld, 1997), political economists stress 
the importance of political decisions about capital flows. Before the crisis erupted, banks in 
trade surplus countries had excessively lent money to the private and public sectors in less 
competitive countries (Blinder, 2013).  
 Indeed, moving capital from surplus countries is in the short term attractive for most 
involved actors as banks of surplus countries search (and find) financing options with higher 
yields in the fast-growing economies of deficit countries, while trade deficit countries can 
expand their economy through consumption and credit (Hall, 2012). If policy-makers do not 
enact counter-measures against this dynamic, the imbalances among deficit and surplus 
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countries accumulate up to a point where housing or asset markets of borrowing countries grow 
into a boom and then a bubble (Blinder, 2013). In fact, a number of authors even consider the 
Eurozone crisis primarily a problem of accumulating balance-of-payments imbalances, where 
large sums of financial capital flow from banks of current account surplus countries to 
borrowing countries (Copelovitch et al., 2016; Scharpf, 2011). Frieden and Walter (2017: 373) 
summarize what happened when this dynamic found its detrimental end: “When the bubble 
burst, lending dried up, and the heavily indebted countries found themselves unable to service 
their debts, unable to make up for the collapse of domestic demand by exporting, and unable to 
borrow additional funds[.]” 
 As one consequence, when the bubble burst, both debtor and creditor countries ended up 
with a related problem: debtors had to pay back their debts, while creditors were concerned 
about the ability to reclaim their assets. For the creditor countries, this entailed the risk of 
needing to bail out their heavily exposed banks and thereby significantly threatening their own 
budgets, possibly with major systemic impacts. In order to avoid such scenarios, both creditors 
and debtors had an interest in finding solutions at the European level.  
 In particular, we expect the exposure of a country’s financial sector – irrespective of its 
status as creditor or debtor – to have influenced its government’s preferences on EMU reform. 
The more exposed a country’s financial sector, the greater the vulnerabilities to external shocks, 
including a worsening of the Eurozone crisis. Governments with more highly exposed financial 
sectors should therefore be more interested in joint European solutions to the crisis than 
countries with lower financial exposure. In other words, it should not be whether a country was 
a creditor or debtor that mattered most for its preferences, as is often assumed, but the degree 
to which it was financially exposed towards other EU countries by registering high claims or 
liabilities.i 
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 This logic ties in with existing political economy theories of governments’ preferences 
(Frieden, 1991; Rodrik, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001) and the roles of leading economic sectors 
and macroeconomic conditions in shaping EMU reforms (Copelovitch et al. 2016; Frieden, 
1991; Moravcsik, 1997, 1998; Wasserfallen, 2014). In the words of Copelovitch et al. (2016:  
825), ‘policy-makers in the Eurozone confront a number of [economic] trade-offs, which 
strongly affect the incentives they face as they weigh their options’. 
  This also corresponds to theories of European integration. Both liberal 
intergovernmentalists as well as supranationalists have stressed the importance of 
interdependence or transnational exchanges in order to explain integration preferences (cf. 
Leuffen et al. 2013: 251). In particular, more interdependence should lead to rising support for 
European integration. In the field of EMU, more European solutions either as more 
redistribution or a stricter regulation of national budgetary and fiscal policies can be considered 
a form of European integration.  
 
H1: The greater a country’s financial sector exposure, the more likely this country’s 
government will be to prefer more power delegation to the EU. 
 
Alternative explanations: Public opinion, institutions, and Eurosceptic parties 
An alternative approach to explaining preference formation privileges domestic politics 
variables. From this vantage point, it is not economic conditions that shape government 
preferences but rather domestic political actors and institutions. This explanation emphasizes 
three main mechanisms focusing on public opinion, domestic parliaments, and partisan 
ideology, respectively. 
 The first mechanism refers to public opinion. While the majority of citizens have long 
been supportive of the European integration project, the opt-outs of the Maastricht Treaty and 
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several failed referendums on further integration steps indicated that ordinary citizens were less 
Europhile than elites (Aspinwall, 2002). The Eurozone crisis led to an intense politicization of 
EU politics (cf. de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009 ;), illustrated by numerous 
demonstrations against or in favor of European integration in different member states. Public 
opinion may shape government preferences, as governments may consider that if they do not 
accommodate citizens’ concerns, they may be punished by voters at the ballot box. As citizens 
care about and have structured opinions about economic policy related to the Euro and the EMU 
(e.g. Chalmers and Dellmuth, 2015; Hobolt and Wratil, 2015; see Hobolt and de Vries 2016 for 
an overview), public opinion may indeed shape domestic governments’ preferences about 
European integration.  
 The second mechanism works through parliaments and governments. While citizens’ 
opinions may directly translate into governmental preferences, domestic parliaments may play 
a crucial role as a ‘transmission belt’ between citizens and the international arena. Several 
studies suggest that the parliamentary arena played a prominent role particularly during the 
Eurocrisis (e.g. Degner and Leuffen, 2016; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013; Wonka, 
2016), suggesting that there may be an impact of these parliamentary actors on a governments’ 
negotiation position as well. In this line Auel and Höing (2015) illustrated that national 
parliaments became particularly active when they have institutional power and economic 
urgency in their nation. A large literature on parliamentary oversight in the EU has shown that 
the power of national parliaments has increased in the last decades and varies between countries 
(Winzen, 2012). National parliaments can in some instances even give binding advice to 
governments as to which position to take (as in the case of the Danish EU affairs committee), 
leading to the expectation that governments react to parliaments the more institutional power 
they have.  
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 This second mechanism also captures considerations related to the ideological orientation 
of political parties. Although political parties represent citizens to some extent, parties may 
have a distinct influence on governmental preferences given an increasing gap between citizen 
and party opinions on the issue of European integration (Steenbergen et al., 2007). To begin 
with, the left-right orientation of political parties in government may play a role in shaping 
governmental preferences. Using voting in the EU Council of Ministers as a proxy for 
government preferences, there is tentative evidence that governments’ ideological orientation 
affects voting in the Council (Hagemann and Hoyland, 2008; Mattila, 2004). However, other 
studies cannot confirm this finding (Bailer et al., 2015; Wasserfallen, 2014; Zimmer et al., 
2005). This controversy suggests that the left-right attitude of governments may matter for 
explaining governmental preferences under specific conditions.  
With regard to the third mechanism, also the Eurosceptic orientation of parties in and 
outside government may matter for government preference formation. In this respect, extreme 
parties from the left and the right use quite different arguments – either economic insecurity or 
national sovereignty related arguments – to influence their voters (De Vries and Edwards, 
2009). Domestic oppositional parties have adopted a populist rhetoric, blaming the EU and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for domestic economic difficulties resulting from the global 
financial crisis, suggesting that international organizations constrain domestic sovereignty 
(Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Vasilopolou et al., 2014; Schlipphak and Treib, 2017; Tarlea 
2018). In an effort to win back voter support for parties adopting a Eurosceptic rhetoric, 
governments may be influenced by this type of rhetoric in forming preferences on EMU reform.  
Taken together, this literature yields three expectations about how domestic political 
factors should matter for governments’ preferences on supranational fiscal policy formation:  
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H2: The more a country’s citizens support further supranational integration through EMU 
reforms, the more likely this country’s government will be to prefer more power delegation to 
the EU. 
H3: The more a country’s citizens support the Euro, the more likely this country’s government 
will be to prefer more power delegation to the EU. 
H4: The stronger Eurosceptic parties in a country, the less likely this country’s government will 
be to prefer more power delegation to the EU. 
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Research design 
Next, we detail how we empirically evaluate our argument and the alternative explanations for 
governmental preferences about EMU reforms. We begin by discussing the operationalization 
of the dependent variable and the independent variables, and then move on to present the 
statistical model (see Online appendix for a detailed overview of the measures).  
 
Measuring governmental preferences on EMU reforms 
The dependent variable taps a country’s observed preferences on a given issue.ii We use original 
data on 47 issues of each of the 28 EU members from the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset (for a 
discussion of the data, see Wasserfallen et al., 2018). To construct our dependent variable – and 
assure comparability – we select 40 of the 47 issues in the data set that share an underlying 
integration dimension; seven issues do not conform to this unified scale, hence they were 
deleted from our analysis (see the Online appendix).iii Following the spatial model of politics, 
issues are scaled from 0 to 100, substantively capturing the least and most integrationist 
positions, respectively, taken by the political actors. There is no natural or objective ending or 
starting point to this scale, and in the coding process we depended on expert judgements for 
relatively positioning the different actors in the political space. Different measures such as a 
preference regarding a certain size or scope of a redistributive measure, or the degree to which 
supranational EU institutions should gain control over national economic and fiscal policies, 
can be linked to degrees of support for integrative measures in the EU or Eurozone polity. A 
position of 0, in practice, only partially corresponds to the status quo; most policy proposals 
were responding to an acute crisis. ‘Doing nothing’, or preserving the status quo was not a 
viable policy option. Therefore, although our scale builds on the relative positioning of actors 
and their positions, the scale can still be substantively interpreted and allows comparison across 
the different issues covered in our empirical analysis (see Wasserfallen et al., 2018). 
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 For example, when in 2012 the European Council agreed to set up a permanent crisis 
mechanism (ESM), some member state governments, such as Germany, insisted on it being 
financed only through paid-in capital and guarantees from Eurozone members (0 on the scale). 
Other countries, such as France, suggested incorporating additional sources, potentially 
expanding its size (100). The final compromise based the ESM financing on paid-in capital and 
state guarantees (0).  
  Our dataset contains a number of 792 observations at country-issue level (resulting from 
40 issues times 28 member states minus missing values, see the Online appendix for a list of 
missing values). In the analyses, we account for the clustered structure of the data, allowing for 
standard errors to be correlated at the level of six groups of issues. Figure 1 provides a more 
fine-grained indication of average governmental preferences within the individual groups of 
issues. The underlying data are the 792 values of our dependent variables, assigned to six 
groups. Figure 1 shows, for instance, that in the banking union group, France was supportive 
of more power delegation to the EU, while Germany was less supportive. Similarly, the second 
group shows Greece being a full supporter of increased fiscal transfers, while Germany opposed 
more power delegation to the EU regarding all issues included in the fiscal transfers group. In 
the last group on future policies, including the Five Presidents Reports and the Eurobonds, 
Luxemburg was supportive of the policies put forward by its former prime-minister Juncker.  
  
 
Figure 1: Governmental preferences across groups of issues
 Independent economic and political variables 
We expect the financial vulnerability profile of a country to be correlated with its willingness 
to delegate more powers to Brussels, or with its willingness to support policies implemented in 
all European countries. Empirically, a country’s vulnerability to the crisis can be meaningfully 
captured by (a) the financial liabilities of its private sector, and (b) the exposure of its financial 
sector to the Eurozone.  
We use a measure of the total non-consolidated financial sector liabilities as share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in percent (Eurostat 2017, See the Online appendix) to measure the 
liabilities incurred by private financial institutions in every member country of the European 
Union. This indicator shows that the European sovereign debt crisis was first and foremost a 
private sector crisis (except for Greece). This eventually transformed into a sovereign debt crisis 
once governments had to bail out their private banks (Hall, 2012). This speaks to the complex 
spillover effects between banking sector risks and sovereign risks.  
Financial sector liabilities are a general measure regarding the level of indebtedness of the 
private financial sector in a country. They are registered vis-à-vis other domestic or 
international institutions and are not defined in relation to other European countries. One 
peculiarity of this variable is that it includes data on financial institutions that have attracted 
large deposits, Luxemburg being one prime example in this respect. Banks that have attracted 
large deposits are vulnerable during a crisis, being also exposed to the risk of a bank run. A 
more direct measure of our main hypothesis would include only cross-border claims within the 
EU. The Bank of International Settlement (BIS) reports such banking statistics, but only for 11 
EU member states (vis-à-vis all other 27 EU member states, whereas Croatia is missing, and 
we had to impute data for several dyads).iv Overall, the data coverage of this nuanced measure 
is too low for our analysis. However, this variable on the cross-border claims of private sector 
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banks within the EU is useful to evaluate the reliability of our main independent variable on 
total financial sector liabilities introduced above. The more fine-grained, but highly incomplete, 
variable of financial interconnectedness within the EU correlates highly with the measure of 
total financial sector liabilities (0.76). This provides further support to the interpretation of the 
findings on our main independent variable.  
To further address the potential bias of the main indicator, financial sector exposure, we 
also rely on Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System 
(TARGET) balances that are recorded on the balance sheet of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) as either ‘Intra-Eurosystem Claims’ or ‘Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities’ in the form of 
bilateral positions vis-à-vis the ECB (Whelan, 2017). Positive TARGET balances reflect 
countries that have lent money to countries in the Eurosystem that register TARGET liabilities. 
Therefore, a positive TARGET balance captures the vulnerability to risks of bond market 
depositors and large corporate depositors in lending countries in the Eurosystem. We use the 
yearly average of average monthly TARGET balances in each country of the Eurozone. Given 
the nature of the indicator as a balance, we divide it into positive TARGET balance (if balance 
higher than 0) and negative TARGET balance (if balance lower than 0). The Online appendix 
provides a descriptive graph regarding governmental preferences in TARGET surplus countries 
compared to deficit countries.  
  In order to be able to isolate the relationship of the financial sector to governmental 
preferences, we control for other potentially intervening macroeconomic variables. Following 
standard practice in the social sciences, we log the GDP variable to treat effects of deviations 
above and below the mean GDP in the same way. Trade balance is considered as a measure for 
competitiveness (the more competitive an economy, the higher its trade balance) allowing us 
to operationalize the theoretical expectations that governmental preferences during the 
Eurocrisis have been shaped by its level of competitiveness within the global economy. 
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According to the findings of Armingeon and Cranmer (2017), the level of competitiveness 
should be a strong predictor of a country’s position during the crisis. 
  Scholars use the interest rates for long-term government bonds as a market measure of 
how the crisis varied across EMU countries. The empirics clearly show that there is a correlation 
between trade deficits and the depth of the economic crisis: the worse the current account 
balance of a country, the more the long-term interest rates increased in the crisis years. We 
include long-term interest rates for Germany (percentages per annum; period averages; 
secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities of close to ten years) that we 
refer to as spread on the German bonds. The levels of public debts are also expected to explain 
variation in our dependent variable. Countries with higher debts should be more likely to favor 
power delegation to the EU. Relatedly, we also control for the size of the public sector, which 
is as an approximation for the role of the state in the economy and the associated ideas about 
its function in society. The variable used is total general government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (See the Online appendix).  
  Similarly, higher unemployment levels are expected to be associated with a government’s 
preferences for more European integration. Lastly, being a member of the Eurozone could also 
influence governments’ preferences for more European integration, as Eurozone countries are 
more directly influenced by the EMU reform negotiations.  
  To test the alternative explanation, we introduce several measures tapping the three 
identified mechanisms through which domestic politics may influence government preferences 
(i.e. citizens, parliaments, and parties), respectively.  
  We capture citizens’ potential influence through three public opinion measures based on 
Eurobarometer data. The first two measures, EU trust and euro support, capture the percentage 
of those citizens that tend to trust the EU and the percentage of those citizens who support the 
euro. They are coded yearly. The third measure, EMU reform support, captures public support 
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for more integration through EMU reforms at the level of policy groups. To code this measure, 
we use the responses to different Eurobarometer questions for the different policy groups. For 
example, for the issues categorized in the group of issues related to the ‘Banking Union’ that 
were decided in 2013 and 2014, we use a measure from 2010 capturing the percentage of 
citizens who think that the EU should prioritize strengthening the regulation of financial 
markets (Eurobarometer 84.3, 2015). For all issues, we used Eurobarometer data measured in 
the year preceding the adoption of the respective fiscal policy reform proposal at the EU level. 
Where this was not possible, we used the temporally closest Eurobarometer (see the Online 
appendix ). All public opinion measures were aggregated at the country level using post-
stratification weights. 
  With regard to the institutional channel, we include two yearly measures. First, the 
Parliamentary Power Index introduced by Winzen (2012) that seeks to capture the control of 
national parliaments over EU affairs. Second, we calculated the left-right government ideology 
using time-invariant unweighted mean values of information from party expert surveys on a 0 
to 10 scale (cf. Döring et al., 2016). 
  To capture the influence of political parties, we use three main measures. First, we include 
the left-right orientation of parties in national government in terms of time-invariant 
unweighted mean values of information from party expert surveys on a 0 to 10 scale. If there 
are multiple cabinets in one year, we code the cabinet with most days in office (Döring and 
Manow, 2016). Second, the attitudes of parties in and outside government toward European 
integration may matter. We capture this using two measures. First, we use the percentage of the 
vote share of Eurosceptic parties more generally by using data from the European Parliamentary 
Elections.v We code a measure of the 2009 vote share of Eurosceptic parties, and another 
capturing the percentage change in vote share of Eurosceptic parties from 2004 to 2009. For 
some Eastern European countries, there were no elections in 2004 but in 2007, so that we 
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calculated the percentage change from 2007 to 2009. This latter measure allows us to check if 
the growth or decline of Eurosceptic parties may have mattered. We coded the vote share for 
‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties only. Such parties are in principled opposition to European 
integration (cf. Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) and are listed in De Vries (2018: 134-136).
  
Model specification 
To explore our argument and the alternative explanations empirically, we specify a series of 
multi-level models which take into account that government preferences for more European 
integration may vary across different groups of issues. For example, we would expect financial 
sector liabilities to have a larger impact on governmental preferences when issues deal with the 
banking union than with EU financial governance more broadly. To create groups of issues, we 
categorized the 40 issues in six groups: EU financial integration, fiscal transfer, banking union, 
treaty or secondary legislation change, austerity, and future policies. Individual issues 
pertaining to each group are listed in the Online appendix. Governmental preferences show 
interesting variation across groups of issues (see Figure 1). On average, preferences to shift 
more power to the European level in respect to fiscal transfer and to the Banking Union, have 
been higher than for the other policy groups. For example, the banking union group included 
issues measuring governmental preferences about an EU cap on bank bonuses. The 
disagreement was whether this should be legally approved, or whether shareholders’ approval 
would suffice. Issues pertaining to the austerity group and to future policies have registered 
average support reflected in governmental preferences. The austerity group includes, among 
others, the debate regarding the first Greek bailout. Governmental preferences have been not to 
delegate more power to the EU for issues in the group on the institutional change of the EU.  
 We add a variable denoting the six groups in order to use random-intercept models 
including covariates at level 1 for the 28 countries and a random intercept at the level of groups. 
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The intercept is allowed to vary across groups to accommodate cross-group differences in 
government preferences (cf. Gelman and Hill, 2007). While country preferences change over 
time and the issue-groups are clustered in years, we do not have theoretical expectations about 
time-varying preferences. We therefore do not account for time in the main regression tables 
and instead provide robustness checks including fixed-effects for years. These robustness 
checks show that our main results are robust (reported in the Online appendix). Based on these 
considerations, the general model is written as follows:vi  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝜁𝑗 + 𝛽𝑿𝑖 + 𝛽𝑽𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 
 
where ζj is the intercept that varies over policy group j, x are vectors for country-level controls, 
v are vectors for controls varying across countries and policy groups, and εij is the error term 
that is separate for group-level j. 
 
Results 
The key result from the multi-level regression analysis is that economic factors have 
explanatory power, while political factors have little (Table 1). The first two models include 
the economic variables of our argument, Model 3 operationalizes the political factors, while 
Models 4 and 5 are concomitant models including all variables.vii 
  Four robust results stand out. First, the coefficient of financial sector liabilities is 
statistically significant and positive throughout, indicating that a government is more willing to 
increase the prerogatives of European institutions if its economy has an oversized financial 
sector that would be difficult to control (or bail out) domestically. This suggests that if a 
financial sector is a few times higher than the entire GDP of the country, this is perceived to be 
as a too great risk to be only dealt with at domestic level, implying that governments prefer 
greater supranational integration in reforming the EMU.viii Countries registering very high 
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financial sector liabilities have been Cyprus, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Romania and Slovakia had the lowest scores on the financial sector liabilities 
variable. Given that the financial sector liabilities metric captures currency and deposits, debt 
securities, loans, equity and investment fund shares/units, insurance, pensions and standardized 
guarantee schemes, financial derivatives, and employee stock options (Eurostat, 2017), this 
result indicates that a larger financial sector in relation to a country’s GDP may indeed increase 
perceived vulnerability and thus government preferences for deeper EMU integration. This 
finding indicates that high exposure of the financial sector – in debtor and creditor countries 
alike – is associated with particular preferences on EMU reform.  
  Second, the significant interaction term between a target surplus dummy and target 
balance suggests that a more positive TARGET balance strengthens pro-integration preferences 
in TARGET surplus countries, but does not do so in TARGET deficit countries (Model 2), 
controlling for GDP/capita and financial sector liabilities. This suggests that countries whose 
central banks register higher claims towards other central banks in the Eurosystem are more 
likely to be supportive of European integration than those that register higher liabilities. We 
depict the marginal effect of target balance on governmental preferences in Figure 3.  
  Third, with regard to the remaining structural factors that we test, results suggest that 
governments prefer more ambitious solutions to the EMU reforms if unemployment rates are 
relatively high. A 1 percentage point increase of unemployment rates moves government two 
units up on the anti- vs. pro-integration scale (e.g. Model 4). Fourth, governments appear to 
prefer EMU reform solutions that lead to relatively more integration the larger the public sector 
of their country is. Indeed, moving public expenditure per GDP up by 1 percentage point leads 
to an expected 1-2 unit increase on the anti- vs. pro-integration scale (e.g. Model 4).With respect 
to the political explanations, we did not find a correlation between public opinion and 
governments’ positions, even for the quite nuanced measurements of public opinion on the 
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policy group level. This finding does not corroborate the account that governments are 
responsive to public opinion in EMU negotiations. That national domestic politics (in the form 
of the partisan left-right orientation of the governemnts) appears not to have mattered could be 
due to the variation in how far EMU reform was politically contested in member states. For 
example, in Finland, partisan political conflict on the issue of EMU reform was absent and 
reforms entered the political debate rather late after they were decided on. In Germany where 
there was more partisan political conflict (Degner and Leuffen, 2018; Wimmel, 2012), the two 
largest parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, from 2013 onwards were in 
a governing coalition and therefore had strong incentives to find consensus on reforms rather 
than publicly debating the issue (e.g. Koalitionsvertrag, 2013). However, we also see 
comparatively strong intra-party dissent, highlighting that external pressures might have 
silenced ideological differences.  
 On the institutional side, the parliamentary power index is negatively significant 
in Models 3 and 4, which led us to further explore its effects. To do so, we replicated Table 1 
by excluding the unemployment measure which is moderately correlated with some of the 
structural economic factors (see the Online appendix). Finally, the results on the parliamentary 
power index suggest that powerful parliaments may tend to favor less integration and influence 
government preferences accordingly, probably in order to keep their control over EU affairs. 
However, the finding is not robust across models. We also replicate the results in Table 1 by 
coding the dependent variable as a binary variable. All issue positions below 50 are coded 0 
and 1 otherwise. Zero captures the least ambitious reform proposals, while 1 the most ambitious 
reform proposals on this binary scale. Results are robust to this specification (see the Online 
appendix). 
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Table 1. Multi-level models of governmental preferences 
  1. 2. 3. 4 5      
Budget Deficit -1.10 -0.88  -1.21 -1.52*  
(0.56) (0.45) 
 
(0.74) (0.51) 
Financial Sector Liabilities/100 0.28*** 0.23** 
 
0.21*** 0.26*  
(0.08) (0.08) 
 
(0.06) (0.11) 
Eurozone Member 
   
-12.98 0.00     
(11.64) (0.00) 
Trade Balance -0.00 -0.01 
 
0.00 -0.00  
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Spread over German bonds -1.05 -0.56 
 
-2.06* -1.47  
(1.01) (1.22) 
 
(0.86) (0.65) 
Unemployment 1.62* 0.65 
 
1.97*** 1.35  
(0.77) (1.08) 
 
(0.56) (0.90) 
Public Sector Size  1.71 0.85 
 
1.93*** 1.89  
(0.88) (0.96) 
 
(0.48) (0.98) 
Log GDP/capita -6.33 -2.29 
 
-8.15* -11.61  
(5.32) (5.71) 
 
(3.52) (10.67) 
TARGET Balance/100 0.00 -0.01 
  
-0.00  
(0.00) (0.00) 
  
0.00 
TARGET Surplus 
 
-12.31 
  
-7.67   
(8.23) 
  
(9.15) 
TARGET balance*TARGET surplus 
 
0.01* 
  
0.00   
(0.00) 
  
. 
Public Trust in the EU 
  
-0.07 -0.25 -0.07    
(0.31) (0.42) 0.46 
Public Support for the Euro 
  
21.57 39.68     
(14.41) (23.52)  
Public Support for EMU Reform 
  
-6.66 -8.67 -8.41    
(4.64) (6.46) (10.80) 
Parliamentary Power Index 
  
-17.18* -10.40** 10.53    
(7.63) (3.92) (5.54) 
Left/Right Govt Ideology  
  
-0.97 -2.37 -1.01    
(1.42) (1.64) (2.02) 
Eurosceptic Party 
  
-0.49 -0.78 -0.36    
(0.33) (0.58) (0.99) 
Constant 23.20 29.27 83.79** 65.51 104.60  
(42.57) (44.80) (29.78) (46.26) (84.84) 
Constant Level 1 4.53** 6.29*** 0.00 1.83    
(2.41) (2.83) (0.00) (5.12)  
Constant Level 2 45.73*** 45.18*** 45.19*** 43.93** 43.40*** 
  (1.58) (1.83) (1.82) (2.35) (2.46) 
N 499 499 565 542 381 
N (group-level) 6 6 6 6 6 
BIC 5265.90 5255.87 5947.73 5677.24 3990 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Linear random-
intercept models using maximum likelihood estimation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects of target balance surplus versus target balance deficit with 95% 
confidence intervals (Model 5) 
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Conclusion 
In this article, we have systematically examined the factors shaping the formation of 
governmental preferences on EMU reform in response to the Eurozone crisis. Our analysis 
shows that governmental preferences were mainly informed by the conditions of the domestic 
financial sector. As such, large financial sectors captured by financial sector liabilities and 
TARGET balances have been systematically associated with governments’ preferences 
regarding European integration. According to our analysis, financial sector vulnerability has 
shaped preferences in debtor and creditor countries alike, challenging the common 
understanding that proposals for EMU reform pitted these countries against each other. By 
contrast, political explanations capturing the responsiveness of governments to public opinion 
on the common currency and fiscal policy reform options, and the strength of Eurosceptic 
parties, do not seem to have mattered for governmental preferences. 
 Our findings have three broader implications. First, we conclude about the relative 
importance of domestic economic conditions in contrast to domestic political conditions. We 
show how much even highly politicized decisions have been shaped by economic fundamentals. 
In the realm of our analysis, voters seem to have mattered less, whereas the financial sector has 
taken center stage. While this might be sobering for close observers of the democratic process 
within the European Union, the context of the EMU reform negotiations was extraordinary. In 
this crisis setting, member states’ governments were constrained by economic necessity. Hence, 
political accountability was deemed to rank lower.  
  Second, the article further underlines the importance of studying the complete process 
leading to the adoption of European Union policies. This process spans from preference 
formation, analyzed here, to conflict dimensions (Wasserfallen and Lehner, 2018), to interstate 
bargaining (Lundgren et al. 2018), and bargaining outcomes. This article complements the 
contribution of Wasserfallen and Lehner (2018), in which governments’ underlying preferences 
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are found to be reflective of a fiscal transfer – fiscal discipline dimension. Governmental 
preferences explained in this article also form the basis for the analysis testing various 
bargaining models in the Eurozone crisis (Finke and Bailer, 2018).  
 Third, our results highlight how agreement among governments on supranational 
monetary union reforms may be difficult given that domestic preferences are anchored in 
different economic conditions (Jones et al., 2016; Wasserfallen, 2014). These structural 
economic conditions are likely to further constrain future Eurozone reform given their 
embeddedness in different political economic models (Iversen et al., 2016; Noelke, 2016). 
Structural economic conditions are more stable and stickier than political factors. This is not 
only relevant for monetary integration in the EU, but also in other supranational monetary 
unions in different world regions, where political integration institutions are weaker, such as 
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, 
and West African Economic and Monetary Union. Better understanding the conditions for 
successful financial market regulations and other crisis resolution mechanisms in such 
monetary unions is important given that financial crises strongly affect citizens’ lives.  
Notes 
i i Note that our explanation of the influence of banks in the creditor states builds on the systemic or 
macroeconomic consequences rather than on a special interest logic as promoted by Grossman and Helpman 
(2001).   
ii for the Online appendix contains a description of the operationalization of this and all other variables 
introduced in this section, a list of the issues covered as part of the dependent variable as well as descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations 
iii In order for the scale to be consistent, we recode two issues, IMF involvement in the European Financial and 
Stability Facility (EFSF2) and IMF involvement in the First Greek Problem (G2). More IMF involvement is coded 
as less support for European integration. Also, we exclude five issues of the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset from the 
analysis because they cannot be reasonably put on a scale between more or less European integration. We 
drop Institutional responsibility for SSM at ECB (BU5), private sector involvement (ESM4) and conditionality 
(ESM3) in the ESM, the legal form of the debt brake (FC3) in the Fiscal Compact, Debt relief in the second Greek 
package (G4) and the six-pack rules on good and bad debts (SPA4) and the asymmetry of macroeconomic 
imbalances (SPA5). For example, in the case of the debate on the appropriate form of the legal commitment to 
the stability and fiscal discipline (debt break and balanced-budget ’golden rule’), some member governments 
argued for constitutional-type of commitment, whereas others were reluctant to accept constitutional change 
due to misfit with their legal traditions and/or need to approve the change by the referendum. This issue 
pertains to domestic legal traditions and cannot be categorized as delegating more or less power to Brussels. 
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iv This data can be found at the BIS banking statistics homepage for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
https://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm?m=6%7C31%7C70, last accessed June 5, 2018.  
The BIS plans to collect data on bank claims for other EU countries as well, but this information was not 
available when this article was completed. 
v See http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/election_types/ep_elections/ 
vi There is evidence of variation in the intercepts, supporting the specification of a random intercept model. 
Predicting random intercepts from this general model using preferences as a dependent variable indicates a 
15% difference in preferences on a scale from 0 to 100 between groups of issues. Moreover, the level-2 error 
term 𝜀𝑖𝑗  shows how mean preferences in a particular group of issues deviate from the grand mean preferences, 
with the variance of 𝜀𝑖𝑗  being about 35 for the models presented in the next section.   
vii The models are estimated including different sets of economic variables due to correlations between GDP, 
financial sector liabilities, unemployment rates, and TARGET balances (as reported in the Online appendix). 
viii To further examine if the effect of the financial sector is more pronounced on some issues than on others, we 
allow the slope of financial sector share of the economy to vary across issues. However, differences in random 
slopes are very close to zero, so that we opt for a ‘conservative’ interpretation and choose not to interpret this 
result. 
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